Excerpts:
Military action must be viewed as a component of a comprehensive strategy rather than a stand-alone option for dealing with Iran’s nuclear program. But it is an element of any true option. A true option is a complete strategy integrating political, economic, and military elements and seeing the matter through to a defined and achievable end. For any military element, the sequel to action must be part of the strategy because the military action by itself will not finish the problem of Iran’s nuclear ambitions once and for all. Airstrikes on the Iranian nuclear program or other targets could conceivably reset the diplomatic table in pursuit of a negotiated end to the nuclear program, but they could also easily overturn the diplomatic table. The alternative to the diplomatic table, broadly speaking, is a strategy of containment and punishment of an Iran that ultimately proceeds with its nuclear program. A variety of military measures – air assault, blockade, encirclement, deterrence – could be elements of such a containment strategy.
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[F]ive installations are scattered about western Iran. Each of these installations consists of a complex of buildings and thus many individual bombing aimpoints. Natanz presents the additional issue that its centrifuge hall is underground and would require special techniques to ensure damage. In fact, many targets in Iran would require attack by a variety of “bunker-buster” conventional munitions in the U.S. arsenal. The total number of aimpoints might be in the neighborhood of 100-200, few enough to be easily dispatched in a few nights by U.S. bombs and cruise missiles. The aircraft delivering bombs could launch from aircraft carriers or, in the case of long-range bombers, from the continental United States. Use of bases in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Gulf, Turkey, or Diego Garcia would be politically sensitive, and their availability would depend on the political context of the strikes. The five Iranian nuclear facilities are protected by air defenses, but weakly, and a large accompanying air campaign of defense suppression would not be necessary.
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The same technical issues of effectiveness would face Israel if it carried out an air attack of its own on Iran’s nuclear program, with some important differences. First, Israel would have to choose an air route to get to Iran. There are several possibilities, and all are long and involve overflying the airspace of states not likely to wish to be implicated in the strike: Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Syria, and Iraq (the last implying U.S. permission or at least detection). Second, some routes exceed the unrefueled round-trip range of Israeli tactical aircraft. One option for the Israelis is mid-air refueling, but here again there is the problem of finding a location for the tankers to await the strike aircraft, and the possibility of detection or interception. Another possibility is simply to seize an airport somewhere on the route for the duration of the strike and use it as a refueling stop. Third, because of these difficulties an Israeli strike would be a small, one-flight affair covering far fewer bombing aimpoints than a U.S. bombardment, which could involve hundreds of separate aimpoints. Israel would probably therefore focus on Natanz.
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Military action must be viewed as a component of a comprehensive strategy rather than a stand-alone option for dealing with Iran’s nuclear program. But it is an element of any true option. A true option is a complete strategy integrating political, economic, and military elements and seeing the matter through to a defined and achievable end. For any military element, the sequel to action must be part of the strategy because the military action by itself will not finish the problem of Iran’s nuclear ambitions once and for all. Airstrikes on the Iranian nuclear program or other targets could conceivably reset the diplomatic table in pursuit of a negotiated end to the nuclear program, but they could also easily overturn the diplomatic table.
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