Iran: A Year Later

By Nader Uskowi

On 12 June 2009, Iranians went to the poll to choose their president. A significant segment of the population, especially in the country’s major cities, expected former prime minister and now the opposition leader Mir Hossein Mousavi to become the new head of the government. In a series of events that are still in dispute, the incumbent Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was declared the winner and the country’s supreme leader personally and famously certified his re-election during 19 June 2009 sermon at Tehran’s Friday’s Prayer. Pro-Mousavi protesters came out on the streets in a spontaneous movement we now call Green. At the biggest Green demonstration in Tehran, some three million Iranians demanded a runoff or a new election to no avail. More than 80 people were killed during the government crackdowns on street protesters and thousands were detained, with hundreds still in detention. Many were charged and few were executed. Pro-reform newspapers were shut down and an atmosphere of political oppression and intimidation backed by armed forces of IRGC, the Basij and the police became prevalent in the country. So much so, that this year the opposition leaders cancelled all organized protest activities marking the first anniversary of the Green movement.

On its face, the government came out as the victor, the Green movement was defeated, and the opposition leaders silenced. If I were a pro-government partisan, however, I would not have congratulated myself on the victory. The re-election of Ahmadinejad came with a stiff price for the Islamic Republic. The regime did not need to use heavy-handed tactics to prevent Mousavi from forming the new government; he had already headed the government during the most critical period in the country’s history, the eight-year was with Iraq, between 1980 to 1988, under no less an authority than Khomeini himself. Ayatollah Khamenei, on that 19 June sermon, could have easily ordered for a runoff that would have immediately calmed the streets. Instead a year later, the Islamic Republic is regarded by a significant segment of the population as a police state, the kind of which the Islamic Republic was created to replace. Even if Mousavi were the president, the real power would have rested with Khamenei. Preventing his victory at the cost of loosing political legitimacy among so many citizens was the biggest political mistake of Khamenei’s twenty-year rule.

Iran faces many challenges. Its leaders have consciously decided to meet those challenges through policies of confrontation and not compromise, both within the country and outside its borders. An ideology of extreme right is taking hold in the country. This lowly blogger believe extremism is a sign of weakness and not strength; and this is true not just in Iran. At the end of the day, the extremists have to rule through intimidation and terror, illegitimating their own rule. The leaders need to realize that Iran’s economic, political and foreign policy issues are best addressed through the creation of the broadest possible coalition that would include the opposition. The policies of exclusion and intimidation are not long-run solutions to the country’s problems.